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Community renewable energy promises to play an important role in reducing the generation and 
consumption of high carbon sources of power, as well as in demonstrating the viability of novel business 
models within a transformed energy system built on principles of locality and democracy. The paper 
argues, however, that community renewable energy, in England at least, remains marginal, undermined 
by changing government policies and underplayed institutional factors connected with technology and 
organisational legitimacy. The paper reports on interviews with 29 actors connected with community 
renewable energy in England. The analysis identifies themes implicating various types of legitimacy 
with the partial and uneven institutionalisation of community renewable energy. These are bound up 
with continuing and new institutional rules and the deployment of strategies for (de)legitimising 
community renewable energy, including associated technologies and organisational forms, adversely 
impacting on the potential contribution of community renewable energy to energy system 
transformation. 
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Significant state reductions in support for small scale renewable energy in the UK have been justified 
partly by the growth of community renewable energy (CRE) and reductions in the costs associated with 
technologies such as solar photovoltaics and onshore wind. Some researchers, e.g. Smith et al. [1], 
question the assumptions and limitations of a policy approach in which initial support for CRE  is 
withdrawn gradually as it ‘mainstreams’. Critics are wary of the technocracy of this kind of strategic 
niche management [2, 3] which, in their view, neuters the transformational potential of grassroots 
activism, as it co-opts CRE in ‘incumbent-driven’ strategies of ‘niche advocacy’ [1]. Rather, it is 
necessary to promote community energy activism which is capable of challenging the energy system 
‘mainstream’ [1].  
Recent research recognises the importance of legitimacy to the emergence of new innovation systems 
[4] and to the ability of niches to challenge incumbent energy systems and institutions [5, 6]. This paper 
asserts the centrality of legitimacy and practices of legitimation to institutionalisation of technologies 
and organisational forms relevant to diversification and decentralisation of energy generation. It argues 
that an analysis of both organisational legitimacy and technology legitimacy are required for 
understanding institutionalisation of CRE and its transformative potential [6].  
The paper contends that organisations, individually and collectively, employ legitimacy-building 
strategies as they challenge, work with or around the energy mainstream [7, 8]. Thus, the paper 
identifies and categorises problems of legitimacy faced by grassroots community organisations in the 
CRE ‘sub-field’. Such a designation recognises the structuring effect of the institutionalised energy 
‘field’ on challenger organisations but allows for contestation therein from members of the sub-
population of CRE [9]. The paper considers how CRE protagonists build, maintain but also lose 
legitimacy with key stakeholders (e.g. regulatory agencies or local residents). It considers how the case 
for CRE initiatives and particular technology choices is advanced discursively and how CRE actors 
justify their position within strategies of legitimacy- and coalition-building [10]. Further, the study 
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generates insights into the capacity of CRE to challenge prevailing orthodoxies which characterise 
policies, activities and inter-organisational struggles affecting the sub-field (c.f. [11, 12]).  
Legitimacy refers to congruence with institutional pillars, which are the ‘rules’ which govern apparently 
– or deceptively – stable social relations [13]. Failure to adhere to such rules may incur denial of 
resources, formal sanction or disapproval of audiences whose support is necessary to the success of the 
organisation(s) in question [13]. For CRE, such audiences may be state and local authorities, providers 
of finance and technical expertise, or local residents.  
The political, techno-economic and social structures and agendas are relevant to the legitimacy of CRE 
[4, 5, 6, 14]. The UK Community Energy Strategy states that transformative community-led action 
could stimulate investment, address local needs and involve local people and ‘tackle challenges more 
effectively than government alone’ [15, 16]. Yet in late-2015 the main state subsidies for community-
scale renewable energy projects were drastically reduced [17] and in July 2016 DECC was dissolved. 
Meanwhile, the electricity generation capacity of CRE in England in 2017 was estimated at less than 
150 MW and investment and project activity have stalled [18].1 
It is essential to probe the strategies which might minimise legitimacy gaps (c.f. [6]). Such 
foregrounding is required to develop a richer appreciation of why, how and what changes in legitimacy 
occur and the implications of legitimacy for institutionalisation of CRE and the transformation of the 
energy system. Thus one needs to identify and analyse the legitimacy-building strategies deployed by 
community renewable energy organisations (CREOs) and attendant discursive ‘legitimation strategies’ 
manifest in their arguments for CRE.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on the legitimacy and 
legitimisation of CRE, taking in the topics of organisational legitimacy, technology legitimacy, and 
political coalition-building. Section 3 outlines the methods employed to collect and analyse the data 
gathered for the study, whilst section 4 presents its findings. Section 5 is a discussion of these findings, 
                                                 
1 Generation capacity for renewable energy for the UK in 2017 was over 18,200 MW [19]. 
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in the context of existing knowledge regarding the importance of technology and organisational 
legitimacy to institutionalisation in and transformation of the energy system. Section 6 is a conclusion, 
which summarises the contribution to knowledge and future research agenda. 
2. Literature Review  
Community is not an unproblematic category; ‘energy communities’ [20, 21] or ‘communities active 
in relation to climate change’ [22] are recognised as internally complex and as sites of contestation, 
tension, and distinction [22]. Taxonomies of CRE emphasise the need to recognise differences between 
place-based and non-place-based initiatives and various motives of ‘single purpose’ initiatives and 
those motivated by other concerns as well as energy provision [23, 20]. They also note the extent to 
which community initiatives may be driven by private or collective interests and participatory rather 
than closed processes [24].  
A critical view of CRE should understand the phenomenon (in the global north) within neoliberal 
processes of rolling back the state and the roll out of market techniques, taking less of a rose-tinted view 
of communities than tends to occur [22]. Further, CE is entangled with a range of different actors and  
institutions operating at different scales [25], and there needs to be more attention to normative (what 
is right to do) and cultural-cognitive (the way things are done here) types of institutional factors 
governing CRE, as regulative institutions have already received much scrutiny [26].  
Bearing the above in mind, three emerging areas of concern here are: a) organisational legitimacy and 
the institutionalisation of community energy business models [14]; b) ‘technology legitimacy’ [6]; and 
c) the difficulty of creating and sustaining ‘policy coalitions’ which may enable CREOs to secure 
sufficient and stable funding for their activities [5].  
Recent contributions point to the need to examine actor strategies for building of and struggles over 
legitimacy [6] and an appreciation of the interaction of technology, industry and organisational 
dimensions of legitimacy. Also, there is a need to investigate how strategies and possibilities (e.g. for 
coalition building) for grassroots organisations vary with political opportunity structures in different 
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contexts [10], balancing attention to both processes of incorporation and transformation of ‘challenger’ 
organisations and technologies [27]. A nuanced approach is required to transcend conceptions of 
‘established’ and ‘emerging’ organisations, technologies and business models, in which what is 
important to institutionalisation and transformational potential is their legitimacy and not merely their 
novelty.  
2.1 Organisational legitimacy 
Organisational legitimacy assumes that organisations ‘normally’ act in a manner congruent with 
prevailing formal, normative, cultural or cognitive rules required or expected by cultural and political 
‘authorities…empowered to confer legitimacy’ [13: 60]. A legitimacy gap here entails a lack of 
congruence therewith. Individual organisations can build legitimacy in three ways [7]: a) by conforming 
to conventions and values of existing environments and audiences; b) by selecting environments with 
favourable audiences; and c) through the manipulation of environments.  
One can also identify a number of different dimensions of legitimacy that an organisation can try to 
build: pragmatic; normative; and cognitive [7]. For an organisation seeking to build on the ‘pragmatic’ 
dimension this would involve finding ways to identify and to satisfy the interests of particular 
constituents. The latter in return confer legitimacy on the organisation concerned, which also may 
manifest in commitments and resources favourable to that organisation. Four aspects of the normative 
dimension of legitimacy may be defined, all rooted in moral evaluations made by the organisation 
seeking legitimacy: a) a consequential aspect, which may be conferred to the extent that a constituent 
of a focal organisation considers that the latter fulfills (or has the potential to realise) certain ends; b) a 
procedural aspect, in which a constituent acknowledges the appropriateness of the processes adopted 
and practised by the focal organisation; c) a structural aspect, which concerns the adoption of expected 
organisational forms and structures; and d) a personal aspect, which turns on the charisma and qualities 
of (usually leading) members of the organisation seeking legitimacy. The cognitive dimension of 
legitimacy has, as the term suggests, roots in cognition connected with constituents’ unquestioning of 
the need for, or the taken for grantedness of, the focal organisation. 
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One may distinguish between ‘impositions’ made on an organisation on the basis of influential authority 
and those which rely the exercise of coercive power [28]. Organisations, organisational forms or 
activities may be legitimate in the sense that they conform to social or professional norms, standards or 
expectations. Legitimate organisations, forms, or organisational activities may also derive authorisation 
from society to the extent that they conform to widely accepted cultural beliefs.  
In each case there may be a number – or different types - of authorities conferring legitimacy on the 
organisation in question, including governmental agencies, professional bodies, subsets of society or 
the wider culture. There may be inconsistencies such that organisations may be legitimate to one kind 
of audience whilst illegitimate to another. One type of authority may evolve into, from, or overlay, 
another. For example, the legitimacy of an organisation may depend initially on the charismatic 
authority of a particular leader but may require support in the nature of formally authoritative sanction 
and/or cultural acceptance to ensure continuity. Enforced compliance may not outweigh or outlast 
adherence to rules rooted in voluntary conformance or normative pressure. Also, action taken to ensure 
conformity to one base of legitimate authority (e.g. corporations having a duty in law to act in the 
interests of their shareholders) may be in conflict with achieving conformity with another (the 
corporation acting in a socially responsible or ethical manner, which might subordinate profit-seeking 
activities). The process of gaining legitimacy involves moving over time between satisfying ‘what 
matters’ to an organisation and what is important to external audiences [29].  
It has been argued, however, that such accomplishment will not occur in the absence of ‘technology 
legitimacy’ [6].  
2.2 Technology legitimacy 
Researchers have begun to address technology legitimacy [6], concerned with the match between 
renewable or low carbon energy technologies, policy arrangements and public support. Technology 
legitimacy is necessary for successful transformation of technological innovation systems over and 
above factors connected with the reliability of the technology, its ease of use and market formation [4]. 
A technology legitimacy gap may be understood as ‘misalignment’ between the technology and public 
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and political support ‘elements in the wider context’ [6: 300, see also 30, 31]. Such insights may be 
informative to the present paper, which focuses on a context (England) in which some renewable energy 
technologies, particularly onshore wind power, have been highly controversial.  
Markard et al. (2016) argue that, in the case of biogas in Germany, the gain and subsequent loss of 
technology legitimacy may be explained in terms of first alignment of the biogas TIS with institutional 
structures of agriculture then also with those of energy as the two fields intertwined [6]. This is followed 
by misalignment due to institutional conflict between these fields as biogas technology matured. 
Markard et al. distinguish technology legitimacy from the legitimacy of technological innovation 
system actors but do not examine the latter in their study [6]. In contrast, the present paper is especially 
interested in the implications for the maturing of niches (or institutional ‘sub-fields’) such as community 
energy of both categories of legitimacy, which may coincide within a techno-organisational 
assemblage. In short, technology and organisational legitimacy may not be easily disentangled 
empirically even if they are analytically distinct categories (c.f. [6]).  
Ornetzeder and Rohracher (2013) find that grassroots innovators provide legitimacy to niches such as 
electricity generation from renewable energy sources, by making technical modifications and 
adaptations which enable innovations to diffuse as they link up with broader societal discourses [32]. 
The paper acknowledges the fundamentally different sources of legitimacy of each type i.e. (normative) 
moral obligation and (socio-culturally) taken for granted belief. Further, it recognises the discursiveness 
of legitimacy-building for institutionalisation of CRE and the role of language in the politics of systems 
transitions, as discussed in the following sub-section. 
2.3 Politics and coalition-building 
A political perspective of transitions identifies ‘mechanisms’ [27] which allow coalitions to achieve 
their objectives in the face of opposition from politically powerful incumbents. Important mechanisms 
include mobilisation by grassroots and social movements, framing of arguments for change [33] and 
countervailing strategies (e.g. of financial entities) in support of policies for change. These mechanisms 
may challenge the mobilisation of incumbent regime actors to defend their prevailing positions and 
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activities, lobbying against policies which might promote regime transformation. The formation of 
alliances among ‘countervailing’ actors and grassroots initiatives/social movements may legitimise 
‘distributed’ energy while incorporating local or activist-driven ownership models [27]. Rosenbloom et 
al’s (2016) study of the formation of narratives of solar power in Ontario, Canada, advances discourse 
analysis as an approach to understand better how ‘in transition episodes’ people use language and 
networking to build the legitimacy of innovative socio-technical niches [34]. 
2.4 Closing ‘legitimacy gaps’ 
CRE faces a double problem with respect to ‘legitimacy gaps’, which require investigation to 
understand better the challenges and opportunities for institutionalisation and change in the energy 
system. First, CREOs may be seen by influential constituents as being mismatched with existing 
institutional rules. Thus their legitimacy is questioned, possibly in relation to different bases of 
legitimacy. As the literature review argues, the different bases of legitimacy are rooted in distinct 
authority systems which should not be conflated analytically. Also, both technology and organisational 
legitimacy require analysis, whereas recent work has seen the former emphasised at the expense of the 
latter. Second, CREOs find it difficult collectively or individually to gain, build or maintain legitimacy 
for their values and activities and for changing institutional rules so that these would be congruent with 
the foregoing. Without this legitimacy, or if this legitimacy is not durable or pervasive, it is problematic 
for CREOs to garner the resources, support, and favourable policy commitments they need to flourish 
as active agents in the transformation of prevailing institutions. They attempt to acquire or maintain 
legitimacy, however, and so a view which recognises both the constraints on and possibilities for 
strategic grassroots action to effect institutional change is justified [35]. 
The prevalence of legitimacy gaps and their closure or transcendence is enmeshed with institutional 
structures acting on an organisational sub-field. The argument revolves around the idea that 
organisations seeking to pursue unrecognised activities or to operate in unconventional ways need to 
build legitimacy with influential audiences which may confer the status, resources and other support 
necessary to enable them to pursue their goals. As well as pursuing strategies which position sub-fields, 
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organisations and technologies in relation to broad or selected audiences and environments, the 
protagonists - collectively or individually - engage with discursive, coalition-building processes through 
which legitimation is built. This point remains implicit in existing literature but is brought centre-stage 
here.  
2.5 Analytical framework 
The paper builds on the recognition that legitimacy renders other modes of organisation or processes 
‘literally unthinkable’, whilst verbal and non-verbal communication are fundamental to ‘legitimacy 
management’ (Suchman, 1995 [7], quoting Zucker, 1983 [36]). The paper distinguishes between 
organisational and technology legitimacy-building strategies, which are based on the identification or 
selection of target environments and audiences, and discursive processes of legitimation, employed to 
justify technologies, practices and organisational business models. Processes which may be constitutive 
of all these arenas of legitimacy relate to ‘societal discourses’ and the ‘mobilisation’ of ‘context 
structures’ but, more explicitly than prior research has recognised, through language and meaning 
making in practice. To counter resistance from external audiences, CREOs deploy ‘rhetorical strategies’ 
to build ‘the necessary legitimacy for social change’ [37].  
Arguments may be deployed to legitimise renewable energy technologies and/or CREOs, or that of the 
CRE sub-field. Four types of ‘legitimation strategies’ have been identified in previous work [38] but 
not in relation to CRE. These strategies are: a) authorisation, in which justifications are made referring 
to formal or legal authority; b) rationalisation, in which justification is based on rational argument and 
with reference to the utility of action proposed or taken; c) moral evaluation, which is based on the 
value systems of protagonists; and d) mythopoesis, which concerns justification offered through the 
telling of stories, narrative, cautionary tales and so on. To the extent that CREOs are successful in 
deploying these strategies, they may close the ‘legitimacy gap’ and in doing so gain resources they need 
to build their own position while at the same time helping to consolidate the sub-field and bolster the 
ability of the latter to challenge the prevailing energy mainstream. 
In relation to the above, the paper seeks to answer the following research questions:  
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1) What are the legitimacy gaps that CRE in England has faced (or is facing)?    
2) How do CREOs negotiate or try to build organisational and technology legitimacy in relation 
to formal-regulative, normative and cultural institutional rules relevant to energy generation? 
3) What legitimation strategies are employed in arguing for CRE? What social relations are 
implicated with these discursive processes?  
The study is underpinned by the aim to explain the factors influencing the legitimacy-building and 
legitimation strategies to justify CRE, renewable energy technologies and CREOs, recognising that 
these may be implicitly ‘realised’ rather than intentionally pursued [39]. The following section 
describes in more detail the approach taken to the conduct of the study. 
3. Method 
Data was collected from personal interviews with 29 respondents, from community renewable energy 
organisations and related actors, including local authorities, a distribution network operator, 
representative and support bodies and voluntary organisations, between May 2014-January 2016 (see 
Table 1 for details). Interviews were typically between 45 and 90 minutes long. Respondents were at 
the time of their interview active in or pursuing activities relevant to CRE and included project leaders, 
investors, and support or other organisations (e.g. involved in operating the electricity distribution 




Table 1. List of interviewees and participating organisations. 
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Interviewee Organisations/activities  Length of 
interview 
(minutes) 
1. Chair and co-founder  Community Interest Company; aims to generate 
income through RE and other social enterprises 
making the community carbon neutral 
86 
2. Chair and founder Community Interest Company; aims to provide 
RE to community reducing electricity bills and 
fuel poverty 
Registered society;   aims to fund and implement 
RE projects and energy efficiency measures, to 
cut carbon emissions 
109 
3. Director Community Interest Company; aims to help 
communities/residents live more sustainably;   
Registered society; aims to develop local RE 
generation, to encourage energy saving 
initiatives, to provide support for local 
communities 
Registered society; aims to generate RE, to 
support sustainable community 
Registered society; aims to establish sustainable 
renewable technologies, and promotes the 
efficient use of resources and environmental 
awareness 
97 
4. Director Community Benefit Society; aims to deliver 
community-owned RE projects, to raise 
awareness of and promote local low carbon 
solutions 
52 
5. Director Registered society; aims to invest in RE projects, 
to help local residents to reduce energy use 145* 
6. Director Same as above 145* 
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7. Director Registered society; as energy services 
cooperative aims to decarbonise local electricity 
generation and build zero-carbon communities 
Registered society; aims to support the 




development   officer 
Registered society; aims to create cooperatively-
owned RE projects, to provide training and 
employment opportunities for local people, to 
lower energy costs for local residents 
44 
9. Secretary Registered society; aims to reduce the carbon 
footprint of the area through generating RE 
49 
10. Director/founder Registered society; aims to bring RE to local 
community/area 79 
11. Chair Registered society; aims to provide an 
opportunity for local residents to get involved/ 
invest in RE 
73 
12. Chair Registered society; aims  to provide an 
opportunity for local residents to get involved/ 
invest in RE  
88 
13. Chair Registered society; aims to generate RE, to 
reduce carbon footprint, to support local 
community projects   
57 
14. Volunteer Registered charity (Community retreat centre); 
uses RE sources to generate electricity (off-grid) 93 
15. Director Limited company; invested in local RE project 
to offset the community’s carbon footprint; 
funded by local residents and businesses  
49 
16. Citizen shareholder Community Benefit Society; aims to develop RE 
projects, to support other local energy 




17. Chief executive Social enterprise support organization 49* 
18. Deputy chief executive Same as aboveorganization 49* 
19. Chief executive Environment sector company membership 
organization 
34 
20. Chief executive  CE membership organisation 
Registered society; aims to develop and operate 
RE projects increasing local renewable energy 
provision 
61 
21. Business consultant Planning application support for RE technology  
56 
22. Sustainability manager Electricity distribution network operator 56 
23. Co-founder Cooperative providing administrative support to 
CEOs 101 
24. Community services 
manager 




Registered charity ; provides support for CRE 
projects  
91* 
26. Community hubs 
manager 
Same as above 91* 
27. Sustainability manager Local authority 55 
28. Chief Executive 
Officer 
RE company 48 
29. Activist/researcher CE in Scotland 120 (not taped; 
notes taken) 
Note: * more than one informant interviewed jointly 
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The geographical focus of the study was England, due to differences in policies pursued in the devolved 
administrations which mean that community renewable energy is subject to various regulatory regimes 
and approaches across the different nations constituting the UK. The rationale for selecting interviewees 
was based on the need to choose operational ‘community’ projects of varying scale, a representative 
sample of energy generation technologies, a mix of location type (both urban and rural), and of different 
organisational forms. Figure 1 is a map showing the approximate location of CREOs which took part 
in the study. 40 installations have been made by or in association with 20 CREOs participating in the 
study.2  
  
Fig. 1. Map of selected community renewable energy groups in England. 
Source: www.batchgeo.com 
                                                 




Six different renewable energy technologies were represented, though solar photovoltaics predominates 
with 75% of the installations, approximating its share of Feed-in-Tariff supported initiatives (see Figure 
2, below).  
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of renewable energy technologies installed in selected community projects in 
England. 
Initially, the research team searched a DECC database to identify individual renewable energy sites in 
England . Secondly, the researchers searched the database of the Community Sustainable Energy 
Programme, an initiative which provided capital grant funding for not-for-profit community based 
organisations in England for the installation of microgeneration technologies, as well as project 
development grants. Thirdly, the team approached members of the Community Energy Contact Group, 
which had regular meetings with DECC. Finally, potential respondents were recruited through 
‘snowballing’, via interviewees’ personal networks and at community energy events (e.g. the 
Community Energy Conference 2015). 
The transcribed interviews were analysed using NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software. As well 
as the text of interviews, the analysis of legitimation discourses was based on publicly available texts 
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produced by their organisations (e.g. reports, websites), to identify regularities in arguments for and 
typical representations of CRE/CREOs.3  
Quotations from interviewees are selected for their capacity to illustrate the points made regarding 
problems of legitimacy and legitimation in relation to CRE, and/or for their representativeness in 
relation to respondents’ view of particular phenomena.  
4. Findings 
This section presents findings from the study, in relation to the nature of the technology and 
organisational legitimacy gaps faced by CRE/CREOs in England, and legitimacy-building and 
legitimation strategies employed.    
4.1 Legitimacy gaps  
The findings suggest that particular CREOs and CRE more broadly have had to address a number of 
challenges in an ongoing struggle for legitimacy. Often, CREOs have the enthusiasm and determination 
to deal with those challenges, although several projects discussed by interviewees were abandoned, e.g. 
at the stage of seeking a planning permission or raising finance. These challenges are symptomatic of 
the technology and organisational legitimacy gaps which have needed – and in many cases still need - 
to be closed if greater institutionalisation of CRE is to be achieved. In  summary, interview respondents 
commonly reported that these  challenges are associated with: changing or inconsistent state policy and 
reduction of support available through the Feed-in Tariff mechanism; planning permissions and 
consents; eliciting stakeholder engagement (including local communities); financing; relationship-
building with partners; access to expertise; environmental issues; technology-related issues, including 
installation and grid connection; resources availability and scale; and time constraints.  At the root of 
these challenges are gaps in organisational legitimacy and technology legitimacy, which are outlined 
below. 
                                                 
3 For example, the website of Community Energy England https://communityenergyengland.org/  
 
18 
4.1.1 Gaps in organisational legitimacy    
The findings identify gaps in organisational legitimacy, which may be distinguished in relation to 
pragmatic, normative and cognitive dimensions thereof. For example, in relation to the pragmatic 
dimension the analysis shows that the credibility of CREOs and perceptions of their ability to serve the 
interests of policy-makers on a continuing basis have not been high enough to engender policies that 
have been consistently favourable to them.  
The following points may be made (recognising consequential, procedural and structural aspects) 
regarding the normative dimension of organisational legitimacy. In connection with the consequential 
aspect, interviewees expressed what they felt was UK governments’ wavering confidence in CRE to 
contribute effectively to the achievement of climate change and energy policy goals. One may 
distinguish those who see CRE as democratic, local ownership of generation and as a means of societal 
transformation, and proponents (e.g. the state) of partnerships among established actors and CREOs. 
Each of these may appear as ‘the right thing’ to do for society, whether that is expressed in terms of 
market development, security of energy supply, decarbonising the economy or community building.  
In terms of the procedural aspect, the findings attest to the pressures on CREOs to conform to expected 
ways of working and organising. Those with whom CREOs engage (e.g. funders, installers, developers) 
have certain norms, which CREOs may not share, about what and how things should get done, i.e. 
employing professional practices and procedures. A similar point applies regarding the proper structure 
for organisations (the structural aspect). CREOs, reliant on a few volunteers, often lack the knowledge 
or required routines and skills (e.g. to do due diligence), or are short of the personnel (e.g. finance or 
legal qualified staff) to appear credible to these external audiences – and sometimes their own. Thus, 
CREOs might fail to acquire or lose legitimacy with those in influential positions who could ease access 
to resources. 
The cognitive dimension of organisational legitimacy is manifest in commonly held assumptions which 
de-legitimise CREOs  taking it for granted that they are considered, as interviewees say: risky 
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(environmentally or financially); amateurish; too small to be effective; exclusive (e.g. dominated by  
middle class people); and have unfamiliar business models.  
4.1.2 Gaps in technology legitimacy 
The interviews show a mixed and changeable picture regarding gaps in technology legitimacy, with 
variations over time and between different RE technologies. After a period of state support welcomed 
by proponents of CRE, recent years have seen substantial reductions (notably in the Feed-in Tariff), as 
macro-economic conditions have worsened. In terms of the pragmatic dimension of technology 
legitimacy, supporting onshore wind power is not seen as a vote winner for the Conservative Party that 
has been in government since 2010, whether with an overall majority or in coalition. Nor does state 
support for the more costly technologies fit the short and medium term ‘austerity’ economic policies of 
recent Conservative administrations. The changing dynamics around RE technologies choices were 
acknowledged by interviewees who pointed to the change in technology preferences for CRE projects, 
observing that: ‘[N]ow wind is seen as the most undesirable due to public objections and costs (CEO 
of National Representative Membership Organisation). Moreover, there is marked opposition 
(especially to onshore wind turbine installation) from certain local authorities, which have denied 
planning permission to CRE projects, local citizens and even other green groups.  
Fundamentally, the normative dimension of the technology legitimacy gap relates to a widely held view 
that energy generation, including that using community renewable energy technologies, needs to feed 
a centralised grid. This is a view about the ‘rightness’ of energy system design. Moreover, doubts are 
raised concerning the intermittency, variability and storage of power supplied, which are not shared by 
many advocates of CRE. The extent to which CRE is not taken-for-granted as a way to generate 
electricity or supply heat fundamentally exemplifies the gap in the cognitive dimension of technology 
legitimacy. The continued reliance on fossil fuels and non-renewable nuclear power for energy supplied 




4.2 Legitimacy-building   
CRE has sought to build legitimacy through the establishment of recognised nationally representative 
bodies and a hub for peer-to-peer networking and knowledge exchange. In parallel, a number of awards 
for community energy has been founded. Further, representative bodies (e.g. Community Energy 
England) lobby government to shape policies which might be favourable to CRE, whilst offering 
facilities (an online ‘hub’ and annual conference) through which members can meet, share knowledge 
and promote the activities and achievements of the sub-field. Exploring legitimacy building of 
individual CREOs/projects and the sub-field helps to understand better what constitutes CRE in 
England and the complexity of the phenomenon. The focus on legitimation of individual CREOs and 
CRE projects also allows a closer look at materiality as a basis for legitimacy. 
In practice, CRE projects are techno-organisational assemblages. Achieving legitimacy for CRE 
therefore means building both organisational and technology legitimacy. In terms of organisational 
legitimacy, the key elements identified are the choice of a legal form/business model by CREOs, to 
satisfy legislative, regulatory and funding requirements, and the building of partnerships to secure local 
support or acquire knowledge and expertise for the project or CREO. Building technology legitimacy 
concerns decisions about what RE technologies to invest in and alignment with other aspects of the 
energy system. 
4.2.1 Building organisational legitimacy 
Findings pertaining to how CREOs build organisational legitimacy are presented in relation to four 
types of CRE model, identified according to whether: a) the promoter of an initiative is primarily 
internal or external to the focal CREO; and b) the motivation underlying an initiative is mainly activist 
or entrepreneurial. The four types of CRE model arising from this classification are thus: internal 
activist; internal entrepreneurial; external activist; and external entrepreneurial.  
Internal activist CRE emphasises community ownership and participation. Here, CREOs build 
legitimacy in the pragmatic sense by working with a target segment (e.g. the fuel poor) or community 
 
21 
of place to address their needs. In the internal entrepreneurial model, CREOs adopt the investment club 
model familiar from other sectors, which may be legitimate procedurally or structurally. In external 
activist CRE, CREOs conform to a partnership model, in which the focal local organisation gets support 
from often larger, more experienced organisations with generally sympathetic values or other interested 
intermediaries such as local authorities or universities. This may enable the CREO to address the 
interests of local residents and activists while gaining legitimacy with state authorities in relation to 
organisational processes and structure. Finally, in  external entrepreneurial CRE, CREOs adopt another 
version of the partnership model endorsed by the state, in which the project is instigated or led by an 
‘anchor’ partner, e.g. a commercial developer. 
The most obvious example that illustrate such partnership is the external activist ‘Energy4All’ model, 
in which both Energy4All and its member community co-operatives have a history rooted in community 
energy activism. Energy4All Ltd was created in 2002 by members of the Baywind mutual community 
energy cooperative. It is owned by the community energy cooperatives it assists, which mid-2017 
comprised 15 in England and a total of 22 in the UK as a whole. This model can help small local 
community organisations to compensate for deficiencies in procedural and structural legitimacy, as 
exemplified by the following quotation from a representative from one of the community organisations: 
"Once the project was established […] Energy4All then became the administrators, the management 
team …who delivered the project. We couldn’t exist without them… We’re just totally reliant on them 
for the management of the wind farm." (QJ – Chair of Community Energy Organisation, East Anglia) 
The external entrepreneurial business model, based on CREOs working with companies/commercial 
developers of RE projects, is favoured by the government, and can mean simply buying into projects 
that are already being developed. This approach makes the process of setting up a project much easier 
for CREOs. “The last government encouraged developers to share their projects with communities, and 
what a number of groups are doing is buying a portion, for example, of a solar farm” (LG, Director, 
Northern Community Energy Organisation). 
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Organisational legitimacy-building also inheres in the choice of legal forms by CREOs; 14  groups in 
the study use a co-operative business model and are ‘registered societies’ in relation to the 2014 Act, 
which were previously designated as industrial and provident societies (IPS), and two are societies for 
‘community benefit’ (or ‘ben com’). Three organisations in the study maintained the status of a 
‘community interest company’ (‘CIC’) at the time of being interviewed, though one was dissolved in 
November 2015; only one was set up as a private limited company All of these are legal forms, some 
devised specifically with social enterprises in mind and thus enjoy legitimacy with state authorities. 
Depending on the form they may been seen as legitimate by communities they serve (CICs and ben 
coms) or members (cooperative societies or IPS).   
The interview material shows that developing relationships with and mobilising the support of residents, 
communities and other audiences is important for different types and dimensions of legitimacy. For 
example, in relation to building the pragmatic dimension of organisational legitimacy, a dialogue with 
potentially affected groups/stakeholders (e.g. a fishing community and a boat hire company for a hydro 
scheme) can mean ‘quite a lot of liaison work’, even if the local community is supportive in general.  
Relations with partners, e.g. installers of RE technologies, also vary, depending on whether the firms 
coming from a commercial environment are familiar with the community energy model and share 
similar values. The uncertainty regarding finance for CRE projects, which is common at the early stages 
of development, means that it is preferable for CREOs to deal with big and mature businesses which 
can accommodate some flexibility in terms of timescale and technology capacity needed. Interviewees 
also pointed to the role of financial institutions, which were reluctant to lend to CREOs. As one 
respondent said: “the project really struggled to take off in the early days because simply the banks 
wouldn’t underwrite it”. (QJ – Chair of Community Energy Organisation, East Anglia). 
4.2.2 Technology legitimacy-building 
The interview material highlights the adoption of a technology legitimacy-building strategy based on 
the selection of a favourable environment, as exemplified in the choices of RE technology in which to 
invest. Solar is praised by interviewees from CREOs as ‘fantastic’ and ‘the best technology’ as it is 
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seen as less controversial (compared e.g. with the disapproval of significant sections of the general 
public of onshore wind). It is also generally considered by interviewees to be easier to achieve from a 
financial or regulatory point of view, in contrast with the price of a wind turbine or a hydro-electric 
scheme. However, interviewees also recognise some problems with solar PV. For example: installations 
take land space (in the case of ground mounted solar); existing infrastructure i.e. roofs may not be 
suitable for installations (of rooftop solar). Onshore wind remains attractive to CREOs (if not in urban 
locations): they see that output is higher in the winter when energy is in greater demand; the technology 
works at night; and the amount of land needed is relatively small. Hydro schemes are favoured due to 
the support of local citizens, although dealing with the planning system and additional consents (in 
relation to fisheries and requirements of the Environment Agency) can take a long time. 
One of the crucial elements of technology legitimacy for RE (beyond its ability to actually generate 
power, be financially viable and gain public/local support) is the ability to connect the supply with 
consumption/demand, turn energy into a good,  making profits for stakeholders. The planning process 
for CRE projects does involve considerations about the grid connection and electricity distribution 
networks. It is widely admitted that the complexity of grid connection is often underestimated by the 
community organisations at the early stages of their projects. Technology legitimacy of CRE projects 
therefore typically depends on their compatibility with existing energy distribution infrastructure, which 
might be ‘dated’ and lacking capacity.   
The diversity of CRE projects (scale, location, type of technology) implies variations in terms of energy 
distribution and grid connection.  The study identified three models being pursued: 
(i) ‘Embedded generation’/Compatibility model means that CRE projects are connected to the National 
Grid or the local distribution grid in which case electricity is used locally. Although the approach seems 
simple and straightforward, some compatibility issues arise in relation to capacity in the local grid which 
can put restrictions on the size of the RE project. As stated by one interviewee: ‘we applied to put 2.7 
megawatts in, the grid came back and said there's only enough capacity for 2 megawatts.’ (BY, Chair, 
Community Energy Cooperative, South). 
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(ii) Semi-isolation model allows energy use by the community first before selling surplus to the National 
Grid (but requires a private Grid if not attached to residential houses). In this case, the company (e.g. a 
hydro company or a solar company) sell electricity to local residents or organisations, usually on a 
lower price, before selling the excess electricity to the National Grid.  
(iii) Off-Grid/isolation model is based on the idea of ‘energy sovereignty’ which also can include a 
local micro grid. In our study this model suited communities that are remote from the nearest Grid 
supply of electricity. This approach is seen by its proponents as more ecological and sustainable, 
although the choice may be based on more practical considerations, as it helps avoid extra costs 
associated with Grid connection and in some cases a private sub-station. 
Justification and legitimation of technology choices and related solutions (e.g. grid connection) are 
central to CREOs’ ability to deliver a project in which electricity generation artefacts are core elements. 
Although challenges and controversies surrounding RE technologies are not faced exclusively by 
community organisations, legitimation of technology choices here is enmeshed with organisational 
aspects of CRE, some of which pertain to the ownership model and funding of CREOs. 
4.3 Discursive legitimation strategies  
The discursive strategies employed by CRE/CREOs address both organisational and technology issues 
pertaining to legitimacy building for CRE. Such strategies are deployed to counter widespread 
unfavourable narratives of CRE, to advance the case for CRE. All four types of legitimation strategy 
outlined above are employed: authorisation (an appeal to state authority e.g. government support for 
certain types of RE, legal forms sanctioned by the state and adopted by CREOs); rationalisation (e.g. 
justification of the choice of RE technologies and more broadly for CRE; justifications of different 
business models based on different understanding of the idea of ‘community’); moral evaluation (CRE 
as a ‘good’ thing; CRE as bringing benefits for local communities; growth of a cooperative movement; 
educational benefits); mythopoesis (stories of struggle, resilience and success, often used to counter 
opposition to CRE). These strategies are employed by individual CREOs and CRE collectively, and are 
reflected in discourses, which often overlap and echo each other.  
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However, the discourses differ in their focus and scope, as they address different stakeholders as key 
audiences. For CREOs the range of stakeholders can be very wide but the principal audiences are local 
residents/communities and members of CREOs, local authorities, and financial bodies. This brings to 
the forefront the organisational and technology-related issues (most controversial), which are specific 
for particular organisations and CRE projects. It seems problematic for individual CREOs to deal with 
the lack of political support for CRE (although we have examples of some activists approaching the 
government departments, as well as taking part in consultations launched by the government); this 
legitimacy gap can be dealt with effectively only through collective action.  
Both narrow and less restrictive images of the CRE sub-field identify CREOs as its core. However, 
CRE legitimacy cannot be seen simply as aggregative of legitimacy of individual organisations, 
although legitimacy-building for individual organisations and projects inevitably has an effect on the 
growing legitimacy of the sub-field as a whole. For the CRE community in England, the image of CRE 
goes beyond producing electricity from renewable sources; it involves other benefits such as helping 
people in fuel poverty, providing reduced price electricity to schools, bringing improvements to 
community buildings, improving wildlife areas, attracting private investments etc. The legitimation 
discourse is based on rationalisations in which increasing deployment of CRE represents a positive and 
desirable path. Community energy is argued to have significant potential whilst still being vulnerable, 
immature and dependent, requiring continued ‘nourishing’.   
The discourses generated in the sub-field can be seen as attempts to reinforce institutionalisation of 
CRE. Legitimation of CRE is framed as highly dependent on state authorisation, i.e. government 
support and a dialogue with policy makers, as well as on inner unity and peer-to-peer support. This 
means that the key audiences for the legitimation discourses circulating in the sub-field are the state 
and individual CREOs (existing and prospective). This suggests the thematic organisation and 
characteristics of those discourses, which deliberate the idea of solidarity, unity, sense of community. 
The most prominent and powerful discourses are being shaped by CRE representative bodies and other 
collective forums (e.g. CRE conferences). For them, the government is a key stakeholder who they 
challenge the most.  
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The discourse frames CRE and CREOs as disadvantaged compared with mainstream commercial 
developers, and as dependent on subsidies. Moreover, it also says much about power relations within 
the discourse, in particular about capacity and ability of representative organisations and CREOs to 
influence institutional change. The vision of the sub-field as struggling to lobby their interests or 
influence government’s decisions dominates; depowering community energy also raises questions 
about the relations with the state, to what extent the government policy is susceptible to change, and 
whether opportunities to influence government decisions for a non-mainstream sub-field (e.g. through 
consultation mechanisms) are ‘real’.     
5. Discussion 
The paper supports the argument made by Suchman (1995) that key audiences may withhold support 
from focal organisations, causing the latter to fail to acquire or lose legitimacy with those in influential 
positions who could ease access to resources [7]. Here, findings were presented in the context of CRE, 
an empirical domain which has barely featured in research on legitimacy and the transformation of 
entrenched institutions. The support needed from audiences which could help to realise the 
transformational potential of CRE is withheld for several reasons. These are connected with doubts 
about the capacity of CREOs and related technologies to satisfy the interests of key constituencies 
(implicated with pragmatic dimension of both technology and organisational legitimacy), concerns 
about CREOs’ organisational processes i.e. whether their procedures are fit for purpose and in line with 
what is expected to ‘get the job done’ (the procedural aspect of  the normative dimension of 
organisational legitimacy), and reservations about their organisational form (the structural aspect of the 
normative dimension of organisational legitimacy). Another way of looking at things is to recognise 
the continued legitimacy of conventional energy business models, modes of organisation or actors 
(including local authorities). Even where these have been questioned, this does not mean that CRE has 
the legitimacy necessary to step immediately into the breech, not being the universally taken-for granted 
alternative (i.e. lacking in the cognitive dimension of technology legitimacy). A distinction needs to be 
made between possible de-institutionalisation of high carbon energy and institutionalisation of (C)RE, 
CREOs and associated renewable energy technologies. 
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The question of how CREOs negotiate or try to shape institutions, may be addressed in relation to the 
strategies employed to build different though interpenetrated types of legitimacy. Acting collectively, 
CREOs lobby regulatory bodies, who are actors in the community (renewable) energy sub-field but also 
have an important role to play within the mainstream energy field dominated by multinational oil and 
gas companies and central distribution of electricity. The ‘field struggles’ involve issues pertaining to 
the level of state support for small scale renewable energy schemes (e.g. via the Feed-in tariff 
mechanism) and the registration of CREOs as co-operative societies, for example. CREOs thus set up 
and contribute to national representative bodies in order collectively to inform or lobby policy-makers. 
Following Markard et al. [6], there was until recently a temporary though partial alignment between 
CRE/CRE technologies and what was valued by the state and wider society. 
A partnering approach was suggested by the UK Department for Energy and Climate Change in its 
community energy strategy [15]. Conformity with this approach conferred advantages to those adopting 
the model in the sense of gaining legitimacy with the state but arguably with some versions of the model 
this comes at the expense of ‘toning down’ unconventional models (c.f. [29]; [40]). The more radical 
individual initiatives have not been able to institutionalise their preferred logic within the sub-field; 
they tend to lack the financial and organisational resources, and supportive networks of those operating 
in the partnership or more ‘energy entrepreneurial’ business models (c.f. [14]; [41]; [42]). In any case 
this mode goes against the grain of highly local grassroots community energy, premised on rather 
different visions of energy citizenship and democracy, entailing societal, not merely ‘energy system’ 
transition. 
There are two distinct groups which contest the legitimacy of CRE: (1) actors embedded in the CRE 
sub-field, for whom CRE is the primary activity (CREOs and activists, support organisations and 
networks); and (2) ‘external’ actors associated with CRE (government, local authorities, network 
operators, businesses e.g. contractors). External and embedded actors have different views of the 
legitimacy of CRE; there is a struggle over it, inherent in the language strategies of CRE discourse. For 
embedded actors, the value of CRE is unquestionable; it diversifies energy supply, contributes to 
renewable energy generation targets and builds resilience of the energy system and local communities.  
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For the state and other audiences – a simplified, standardised approach is preferred, with CRE to be 
complementary with other socio-technical arrangements, e.g. around energy in case of energy policy, 
around business models in case of business relations and contracting, around local infrastructure, 
communities and public acceptance for local authorities etc. Moreover, for the state, energy is seen as 
a strategic resource that needs to be governed centrally. Thus, the state may not be interested in CRE 
growth that would mean more diversified, dispersed, and perhaps uneven and less controllable energy 
supply.      
The struggle over the legitimacy of CRE can be explained through the prism of alignment/misalignment 
with existing institutional structures and institutional conflicts. CRE initiatives align well with certain 
institutions and material infrastructures which translate similar meanings and values (e.g. of 
‘community’, ‘community ownership’, ‘sustainability’, ‘sustainable energy’), e.g. an alignment with 
existing village infrastructure (using a wind turbine to generate power for the community building) as 
they both translate the idea of community. However, there is misalignment with well-established 
institutions (e.g. reliance upon a centralised grid and nationwide electricity networks, certain financial 
and legal rules and infrastructural requirements for some RE technologies), posing particular challenges 
for activist-driven CRE/CREOs. This suggests the need for a flexible and adaptive approach if 
institutionalisation of CRE in existing institutional settings is to be achieved.  
6. Conclusion 
The paper aimed to answer research questions pertaining to the technology and organisational 
legitimacy and institutionalisation of potentially system transforming community renewable energy 
(CRE), CRE technologies and organisations (CREOs) in the case of England. It sought to identify and 
analyse: legitimacy gaps facing CRE, CREOs and CRE technologies; and the legitimacy-building and 
discursive strategies employed.  
A core issue concerns how ‘niche’ CRE can challenge orthodoxies [1] to transform the energy system. 
Although CRE benefited from state support for a decade up to 2015, more recently this (i.e. Feed-in 
tariffs) has been substantially reduced. The paper highlights gaps in organisational and technology 
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legitimacy that have contributed to the situation, including organisational issues to do with lack of 
confidence in CRE/CREOs and technical ones, such as grid connection and installation. The paper 
concludes that a perspective that analyses both technology legitimacy and organisational legitimacy has 
greater capacity to interrogate effectively the institutionalisation of CRE than the adoption of either 
approach alone.  
The paper notes the prevalence of and congruence with state preferences of ‘externally entrepreneurial’ 
legitimacy-building strategies involving partnership with actors who may not be pre-disposed towards 
CRE, or who have resources and expertise but weak commitment to more radical CRE. It notes too that 
some local ‘internal activist’ grassroots initiatives prefer to operate in already favourable environments, 
though may join a network of sympathetic partners to address perceived or actual organisational 
deficiencies (c.f. the Energy4All model). The paper develops Bolton and Hannon’s [14] insights 
regarding business models and change in socio-technical systems. Here, the co-evolution of business 
models and RE policy effectively incorporates CRE into an energy system designed for centralised 
generation by large utilities.  
CRE proponents employ various discursive strategies to build coalitions and win support and counter 
arguments that CRE technologies and organisations are ineffective, poorly organised or harmful to the 
environment. Taken-for-granted ‘cognitive’ legitimacy of CRE (at least for some technologies, such as 
onshore wind)  eludes influential state and local actors, affecting the quality – if not quantity or speed 
– of overall RE diffusion. Further research is required to identify how CREOs might more effectively 
argue their case for support, particularly where this involves currently less favoured energy technologies 
or business models. Studies may also provide examples of effective organisational practice on which 
future discursive strategies can be anchored.  Whilst the current study is limited in its focus on 
phenomena in one country, it advances the understanding of  institutionalisation, legitimacy- and 
coalition-building in distributed energy/CRE . It is hoped that future work will further extend 
geographical coverage, to provide a more contextually sensitive understanding of institutionalisation 
and legitimacy of CRE and their implication with energy system transition.  
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